Addressing NCDs: Protecting Health From Trade and Investment Law; Comment on “Addressing NCDs: Challenges From Industry Market Promotion and Interferences” by Cowling, Krycia & Magraw, Daniel
Addressing NCDs: Protecting Health From Trade and 
Investment Law
Comment on “Addressing NCDs: Challenges From Industry Market Promotion and 
Interferences”
Krycia Cowling1* ID , Daniel Magraw2
Abstract
Building on Tangcharoensathien and colleagues’ description of four tactics used by the tobacco, alcohol, 
processed food, and breast milk substitute industries to interfere with the development and implementation of 
health policies, we present a fifth tactic: trade and investment disputes. We describe recent examples of trade and 
investment claims filed by the tobacco industry to challenge plain packaging legislation, which may serve as a 
model for future claims by this and other industries. Next, we clarify specific areas of potential conflict between 
non-communicable disease (NCD) control policies and trade and investment agreement (TIA) commitments, 
identifying possible vulnerabilities that may be exploited by industry to challenge the legality of these policies. 
We conclude with ideas to strengthen the position of health policies vis-à-vis commitments in TIAs. 
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As described by Tangcharoensathien and colleagues in their editorial “Addressing NCDs: Challenges from Industry Market Promotion and Interferences,” 
tactics deployed by the tobacco industry to interfere with 
the development and implementation of legitimate health 
policies are increasingly also utilized by the alcohol, processed 
food, and breast milk substitute industries.1 If these industries 
continue to follow the trajectory of the tobacco industry, 
they can be expected to utilize trade and investment disputes 
as an additional avenue of potential attack, by exploiting 
commitments in trade and investment agreements (TIAs) in 
attempts to undermine health policies. In addition to the four 
types of industry tactics described by Tangcharoensathien 
and colleagues, challenges from claims under TIAs comprise a 
fifth category the public health community should be alerted 
to as it works to develop policies to reduce consumption of 
tobacco, alcohol, highly processed foods, and breast milk 
substitutes when breast milk is available. 
Recent Examples From the Tobacco Industry
In the case of tobacco, trade and investment disputes have 
recently occurred through two mechanisms. Corporations 
have directly sued governments through what is known as 
investor-state dispute settlement, a provision included in 
most international investment agreements since the 1990s.2 
A prominent example of this is Philip Morris v. Uruguay, 
in which the tobacco company Phillip Morris Products 
(Switzerland) filed a claim against Uruguay, arguing that 
its law requiring 80% of tobacco packaging be covered with 
a health warning label violated the company’s intellectual 
property rights under the Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral 
investment treaty.3 Second, industries have utilized their 
influence to encourage governments to file claims against 
other governments on behalf of their interests. This is the more 
long-standing mode of complaint, enshrined in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules and provided for by the 
dispute settlement clauses of most trade agreements. A recent 
example is Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging (Honduras), 
filed at the WTO by Honduras and several other tobacco-
exporting countries over Australia’s plain packaging law for 
tobacco products, raising similar arguments as the investment 
case against Uruguay.4 The rulings in these two examples 
were ultimately in favor of the plain packaging laws, but were 
decided after legal battles costing the respondent countries 
millions of dollars and spanning several years. Those costs 
were not fully recovered: for example, only the costs of the 
arbitration process and about 70% of legal costs were ordered 
to be reimbursed by Phillip Morris in the investment case, 
leaving Uruguay to pay approximately US$3 million.5 
It may come as a surprise to many in the public health 
community that the legality of such health policies is even 
questionable under international trade and investment rules. 
However, many of the “best buy” interventions endorsed by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) for combatting key 
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non-communicable disease (NCD) risk factors6 arguably 
have the potential to be interpreted as interfering with TIA 
commitments. With almost 300 trade agreements7 and over 
2000 investment agreements in force,8 and because cases 
decided under one agreement are not binding on subsequent 
cases (particularly those brought under other agreements), 
the potential for harassment is huge. As governments continue 
to consider and develop new policies to restrict advertising, 
enact product-specific taxes, mandate various types of health 
warning labels, and take other health-promoting measures, 
the possibility of challenges to these policies from the tobacco, 
alcohol, processed food, and breast milk substitute industries 
through the mechanisms created by TIAs should not be 
dismissed. 
Sources of Potential Conflict Between Health Policies and 
Trade and Investment Agreements
The key commitment in all TIAs is that foreign and 
domestic products and capital be accorded equal 
opportunity to participate in the national market, referred 
to as “non-discrimination.”9 A policy that differentially 
and disadvantageously affects the sale of a foreign good, 
service, or investment may be accused of being disguised 
protectionism, and raised as a possible violation of a trade or 
investment agreement commitment. This is a key potential 
point of contention for any measure that seeks to discourage 
consumption of a good or service based on its value for health 
– if, for example, items whose consumption are discouraged 
are disproportionately of foreign origin or produced with 
foreign capital, the policy can appear discriminatory. In many 
low- and middle-income countries, where sales of these 
products are increasing most rapidly, the majority of alcohol, 
tobacco, highly processed food, and breast milk substitute 
products are imported or domestically manufactured by 
foreign corporations,10-12 thereby creating the potential for 
policies intended to deter their consumption to appear 
discriminatory against imports or foreign investments. 
Ecuador provides a hypothetical example; the country passed 
a law in 2014 requiring “traffic light” nutrition labels on all 
packaged processed foods to inform consumers of each 
item’s sugar, salt, and fat content.13 However, these labels 
do not apply to prepared foods, such as fried plantains or 
pastries, sold in street kiosks or corner stores, which can also 
be high in salt, sugar, or fat. A manufacturer of processed 
foods could conceivably claim it is discriminatory to require 
nutrition labels for their products but not these unpackaged 
alternatives, whereby the policy favors locally made items. 
While this particular claim has not been made to date, such a 
line of argument can form the genesis of a trade or investment 
dispute. 
In addition, TIAs typically contain norms disciplining 
member countries’ regulations that set health, environmental, 
and safety standards, even if these are non-discriminatory, 
and these norms have given rise to many challenges. For 
example, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards provides that health standards should be no more 
trade restrictive than necessary; and the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, which governs packaging such as 
health-related labels, contains similar restrictions. Investment 
agreements typically require that laws, including those that 
regulate health, must be “fair and equitable,” a standard open 
to wide interpretation. Similarly, investment agreements 
typically require compensation for expropriations, including 
indirect ones. The standard for whether a regulation 
constitutes an expropriation – or seizure by the state – is 
also somewhat unclear. Health, safety and environmental 
regulations have been challenged on both “fair and equitable” 
and “expropriation” grounds, sometimes successfully.4 Thus, 
trade and investment rules such as these can narrow the 
permissible scope, and give rise to disputes about the validity, 
of health, safety, and environmental regulations, in addition 
to any concerns arising from whether these measures are 
perceived as discriminatory.
The Evolving Non-communicable Disease Policy Landscape
The global landscape of NCD control policies is contentious, 
as commercial interests are threatened by new efforts to 
reduce sales and consumption of products that increase the 
risk of NCDs. Latin American countries have led the way in 
implementing front-of-pack nutrition labels,14 but records 
from meetings of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade committee indicate members have recently raised 
concerns about these policies in Ecuador15 and Peru,16 among 
others. Concerns have also been raised about a proposed 
policy in Thailand to limit the use of celebrities and cartoons 
on alcohol labels17 and a measure in Nepal to require graphic 
warnings or statements on alcohol beverages.18 While 
committee meetings are intended as a forum to resolve 
differences before reaching the level of a formal claim, these 
actions indicate that new NCD policies are closely monitored 
by industry and that countries are likely to face pressure to 
repeal existing policies or to weaken or not enact policies 
under consideration. 
Other examples indicate that the risk is not only of claims 
being raised against health policies, but also the inclusion 
of ever-tighter requirements in new TIAs that further limit 
the scope of allowable measures. In the renegotiation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, it has been reported 
that the United States pressed to include language restricting 
the ability of member countries to enact measures that 
would require warning labels about health risks on highly 
processed “junk” foods and sugary beverages.19 On the other 
hand, some countries have taken the opportunity presented 
by the negotiation of new agreements to preempt industry 
challenges to health policies. For example, the recently signed 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership bars claims by tobacco companies under the 
agreement.20 
Possible Ways Forward for Health Policy
Somewhat ironically, partial solutions, as well as early 
indications of the problem, may come from following the 
example of tobacco. The Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC), adopted in 2003 and considered “the first 
global public health treaty,” is an international agreement that 
commits countries Party to it to enact various measures to 
discourage tobacco use.21 While the FCTC has been criticized 
for not having stronger language on trade,22 it nevertheless 
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provided important validation for Uruguay in its investment 
case by supporting its plain packaging measure with an 
international treaty commitment. The enactment of similar 
treaties to govern other high-risk products may likewise 
help to provide legal foundation to combat any relevant 
TIA claims. International agreements on alcohol23 and the 
marketing of junk food to children24 have been proposed. 
However, such agreements are not likely to be created 
easily given the powerful reach of the affected industries, as 
evidenced by the US’s recent opposition to a WHO resolution 
to limit inaccurate or misleading marketing of breast milk 
substitutes.25 However, inter-governmental organizations can 
play constructive roles even in the absence of new treaties. 
Uruguay’s case, for example, was buttressed by a report on 
labeling from the WHO.
In time, the severity of these concerns will become clear. In 
tobacco plain packaging disputes to date, dispute settlement 
panels have appropriately weighed health concerns, though 
the cost of defending those concerns has been unconscionably 
high. Hopefully, policies to combat the growing global NCD 
epidemic will continue to take precedence over claims of 
discrimination, loss of intellectual property rights, or other 
alleged violations of TIA commitments. Regardless of 
whether additional health measures are attacked via formal 
trade or investment claims, there is clear evidence that 
industry influence is already affecting the language of new 
treaties and pressuring countries as new health policies are 
being drafted. The public health community would be wise 
to take the offensive, by increasing awareness of this potential 
threat to NCD control; improving interdisciplinary public 
health education with insights from international law; and 
collaborating with trade and investment ministries to carefully 
design new health measures that are not trade restrictive and 
to bar these industries from bringing challenges under TIAs 
or requiring them to pay the full cost of defending against 
such claims. Pursuing additional product-specific treaties 
akin to the FCTC should be a priority to further support 
the international legal foundation for policies discouraging 
consumption of alcohol, highly processed foods, particularly 
sugar sweetened beverages, and breast milk substitutes in 
place of breast milk. Anticipating and blocking avenues of 
potential attack from industry, such as those posed by TIAs, 
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